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A-Priority and Hermeneutics: 





Like Husserl, the young Heidegger was preoccupied with the a-priority of phenomenology. He also 
incorporates hermeneutics into phenomenology, though Husserl was convinced that the a-priority of 
phenomenology removed all interpretation from its analyses. This paper investigates how the early Heidegger 
is able to make hermeneutics a general condition of understanding while maintaining, in line with Husserl, 
that phenomenology is an a-priori science. This paper also provides insight into key debates in the history 
of phenomenology. I examine two places in which Heidegger departs from Husserl’s phenomenology – the 
doctrine of categorial intuition and the “as-structure” of understanding – to show that a-priority and 
hermeneutic understanding come together, ontically, in facticity as the only possible starting point for 
phenomenology. Ontologically, however, a-priority and hermeneutics come together in the co-affection of 
Dasein as understanding and being as pre-given. This co-affection is itself dependent on Temporality as “the 
condition of any possible earlier”. 
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1. Hermeneutics and the A-Priori: Incompatibility and Coincidence 
As an enthusiastic student of Husserl, the young Heidegger was preoccupied with the a-priori 
status of phenomenology from the very beginning. In fact, since its inception Husserl framed 
phenomenology as an a-priori science. Already at the time of its inauguration with the Logical 
Investigations, Husserl sought to secure the necessary and universal character of logic from 
the contingency of psychologism1, and by 1910 became concerned with assuring the a-priority 
of phenomenology as the absolute philosophical foundation for all sciences2. As he states in 
Ideas I, phenomenology must be understood «as a science of essence – as an “a priori” or, as 
we also say, an eidetic science»3. This means that phenomenology provides an account of the 
necessary and universal structures of experience. The young Heidegger agrees with his 
teacher that phenomenology must be an a-priori science, since for him, too, the structures of 
experience that phenomenology uncovers are necessary and universal. In this sense, the 
question of the a-priority of philosophical knowledge is central for Heidegger, and not only In 
Being and Time, as Fehér maintains4. The introductory sections of his magnum opus are 
certainly at pains to show that the question of the meaning of Being, along with the 
fundamental ontology that seek to answer it, have both ontic and ontological priority over all 
other philosophical questions and methodologies5. But Heidegger shows a preoccupation with 
such a-priority as early as 1919, where a large part of his earliest extant lecture course “The 
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Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview is dedicated to establishing phenomenology 
as «primordial science» with priority over all other sciences6. 
At the same time, however, the young Heidegger also sought to appropriate the insights of 
hermeneutic theory into his phenomenology. As is well known, Being and Time states that all 
understanding has the structure of interpretation even as all interpretation is grounded in 
understanding: «What [is] explicitly understood has the structure of something as something», 
Heidegger writes, «[where] the “as”…constitutes the interpretation»7. All that is understood is 
understood through a process of interpretation, even Dasein’s own self-understanding: «The 
methodological meaning of phenomenological description is interpretation… Phenomenology 
of Dasein is hermeneutics»8. But Heidegger’s appropriation of hermeneutics also dates as far 
back as the 1919 lecture course, where he states that «the circularity of epistemology» leads 
to an explicitly «hermeneutical intuition»9. 
Unlike the preoccupation with the a-priority of phenomenology, Heidegger’s incorporation 
of hermeneutics was not something he shared with Husserl. For, as Grondin shows, Husserl 
was famously averse to hermeneutics, exhibiting a «twofold allergy», on one hand, to Dilthey’s 
historicism and, on the other, to any role that interpretation might play in the process of 
cognition10. It is exactly insofar as it is an a-priori science that Husserl sees no need for an 
interpretive moment in phenomenology: as eidetic science, phenomenology reaches necessary 
and universal conclusions about the constitutive structures of experience, conclusions that 
cannot vary according to the ego's situation or interpretive criteria. Thus, although 
phenomenology is an a-priori science for both thinkers, Husserl considers it possible to reach 
unvarying and univocal certainty in the analysis of experience, while Heidegger finds at the 
center of this analysis an ineluctable circularity whose motion consists of interpretation. More 
polemically put, while Husserl dismisses hermeneutics precisely because he sees it as 
incompatible with all claims of a-priori scientificity, Heidegger finds that this a-priority can 
only belong to a hermeneutic science, i.e., that a-priori and hermeneutics must fall together. 
It behooves us as readers of the early Heidegger to ask how it is possible that in his 
fundamental ontology these apparently incompatible philosophical characters, the a-priori 
and the hermeneutic, not only coexist but coincide. An investigation of this question is useful 
not only for a more nuanced grasp of the relationship between understanding [Verstehen] and 
Temporality [Temporalität] in fundamental ontology, as we will show. More than this, the 
question of the compatibility of a-priority and hermeneutics serves as a privileged access point 
to Heidegger’s re-elaboration of some central Husserlian concepts. It is only through a 
sustained engagement with Husserl that Heidegger comes to differ from him so radically, and 
for this reason our investigation allows us to observe some crucial points of transition that 
indelibly mark the development of the phenomenological tradition. First, we will investigate 
Heidegger’s engagement of Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition from the Logical 
Investigations. We will see that for Heidegger, the discovery of categorial intuition grants 
access to the being of beings in everyday perception, without recourse to transcendental 
methods. This affords the being of beings the same priority of givenness that everyday 
phenomena enjoy. Second, we will inquire into the radically different treatments of the «as-
structure» of perception from each phenomenologist. For Husserl, the «as-structure» is first 
and foremost apophantic and should be understood as an unexpressed judgment, while for 
Heidegger this structure is fundamentally hermeneutic and represents an interpretation of 
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the possibilities of the being of an entity. This difference in views on the «as-structure» will 
ultimately reveal a fundamental disagreement between the two philosophers over the purpose 
and scope of phenomenology as a science. Heidegger’s hermeneutic account of understanding 
will provide an opening for the analysis of Dasein’s temporality [Zeitlichkeit] as what makes 
possible the a-priority of Dasein’s hermeneutic situation with respect to being. We will 
conclude that it is the hermeneutic simultaneity of Dasein and being, their temporal 
relationship, that is a-priori in fundamental ontology. As we will see, this union of 
hermeneutics and a-priority is ultimately possible because Dasein, as the «there» of being, is 
Temporal [temporal, not zeitlich] at its deepest ontological level. 
 
2. «The Original Sense of the Apriori»: Categorial Intuition and the Priority of Being 
For the young Heidegger, the a-priority of philosophical knowledge was not merely one 
question among others, but rather one of the central problems of philosophy. This is most 
easily observed in his 1925 lecture course, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, where 
the master of Messkirch praises Husserl’s phenomenology for discovering «the original sense 
of the apriori», thereby gaining access to what truly comes first. According to the lecture 
course, Husserl’s phenomenology was able to retrieve the original meaning of a-priority after 
modern philosophy (certainly Kant, but before him Descartes) reduced it to a determination 
of the subject’s way of knowing. Etymologically, a-priori simply means «earlier…what from 
before, from earlier on already is» but since Descartes and Kant the designation “a-priori” has 
applied almost exclusively to a manner of knowing: knowledge is a-priori insofar as it does 
not appeal to empirical inductive experience. As a term for knowledge that comes before any 
experience of the object, the a-priori is thus ordinarily understood as «belonging specifically 
to the subjective sphere…before it [the subject] oversteps the bounds of its immanence». In 
short, the a-priori is normally taken to refer to immanent knowledge because transcendent 
knowledge is always empirical and therefore a-posteriori11. 
Against this modern view, Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition shows that the a-priori 
does not lie only on the subjective side of the intentional relation, but concerns the subjective 
as well as the objective, the immanent as well as the transcendent, or, in Husserl’s own terms, 
the ideal as well as the real. Phenomenological description makes it clear that the 
underscoring of categorial structures takes place on both sides of the relation: «In the ideal 
as in the real…there is in reference to its objectivity something ideal that can be brought out, 
something in the being of the ideal and in the being of the real which is apriori, structurally 
earlier» Something a-priori is already contained in intuition, such that a-priority must no 
longer be confined to the realm of subjective comportment. The a-priori is «indifferent to 
subjectivity»12. 
What is a-priori in the phenomenon is a degree of structuredness that is already given in 
it. Heidegger uses the term «sensory idea» to refer to structures that come from the subject 
matter’s own content, structures that are «already there in every real individuation and so 
[are] apriori in relation to the here and now of… a thing»13. But the very notion of a sensory 
idea is contradictory for the modern mindset, as he discusses at length in reference to Kant 
and Descartes. One of Husserl’s greatest accomplishments is to recognize that intuition 
already contains categorial structures fit for conceptual elaboration, structures which he 
names «categorial intuitions». It is through of the doctrine of categorial intuition that the a-
priori finds its original sense. 
As numerous commentators have noted, Heidegger was captivated by the account of 
categorial intuition in the Logical Investigations more than by that in the later Ideas I14. In 
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this earlier work, the categorial is a different kind of intuition from the sensory in that it 
apprehends not raw sense data, but «such constituents in entities which in traditional fashion 
are designated as categories»15. Husserl’s famous example of expression and its relation to 
perception helps us to understand precisely what categorial intuition apprehends and how it 
apprehends it. A piece of white paper in front of us is perceived and the expression of this 
simple perception is «white paper». Yet Husserl notes that in perceiving the white paper 
«another act is plainly present, which… is different from [purely sensory]: the paper is known 
as white, or rather as a white thing, whenever we express our percept in the words “white 
paper”… [but] a surplus of meaning remains over, a form which finds nothing in the 
appearance itself to confirm it»16. This surplus of meaning is nothing less than the being-white 
of the paper. Both expressions, «white paper» and «the paper is white», state what the subject 
intuits because the being-white of the paper is contained in the intuition as well. At the same 
time, however, we must take care not to collapse the ideal content of the being-white into the 
simple perception of white paper. These acts are of radically different kinds: the white paper 
is intuited sensorily while the being-white of the paper is intuited categorially, as a founded 
structure and not merely as sensory matter. 
What interests the young Heidegger in Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition is precisely 
this discovery that being itself is given in everyday intuitions in a manner that is not reducible 
to sensible content. As Husserl states, «I can see color, but not being-colored, I can feel 
smoothness, but not being-smooth… Being is nothing in the object…[but] also nothing 
attaching to an object»17, which is to say that being is neither a sensible moment in the 
perception nor a category that the subject attaches to the purely sensory. The being of the 
copula, of what marks the difference between simple perception and state of affairs, is given 
in an act of synthesis that itself gives «a form of more authentic objectification of the given 
matter»18. Acts of synthesis and acts of ideation alike are categorial acts which correspond to 
being-structures that inhere in intuition itself and are founded upon it. The state of affairs 
that corresponds to an act of synthesis, as well as the ideal universal that corresponds to an 
act of ideation, are not less real or objective simply because they are not given in sensory 
intuition. Rather, the fact that our everyday, unthematized experience is full of categorial 
intuitions of these kinds should lead us to broaden the narrow definitions of reality and 
objectivity under which we frequently operate, and to realize that objectivity in the broadest 
sense is much richer than the sensory aspect of a thing19. 
It is this richer understanding of objectivity that leads Heidegger to proclaim that 
phenomenology understands the true sense of the a-priori. Intentional consciousness is 
capable of highlighting structural features that are already contained in intuition. Thus, «the 
apriori phenomenologically understood is not a title for comportment [i.e., for the subject’s 
manner of knowing] but a title for being»20. The a-priori is not confined to one pole of the 
intentional relation but rather permeates the noetic as well as the noematic, and therefore the 
way of access to it is neither a transcendental deduction nor the positing of axioms, but simply 
the intentional relation, intuition and its corresponding acts, the phenomenon as it is given 
to the ego. Thus, what is a-priori, or in Heidegger’s terms «that which already always is the 
earlier» is being itself insofar as categorial meaning is already a characteristic of the real and 
of the ideal alike21. Through Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition, Heidegger finally has 
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access not just to entities, but to the being of these entities. The intentional being directs itself 
toward the being of entities through categorial acts, for the categories that are found in simple 
intuition are nothing other than the categorial structures of being itself22. 
We must, however, heed Heidegger’s warning that a clear grasp of the original sense of the 
a-priori «presupposes the understanding of what we are seeking: time»23. The doctrine of 
categorial intuition, as that which reveals the authentic sense of the a-priori, brings to the 
fore both being and time – being, as what is given in its categorial structures, and time, as 
the priority that intuition affords to being. We must at this point clarify the essentially 
temporal dimension entailed in the a-priority of being. 
 
3. Apophansis and Hermeneutics: Husserl and Heidegger on the «As-Structure» 
For our purposes, Being and Time must be read as a meditation on the a-priori as it relates 
to both being and time. Granted, the question of the meaning of being is not explicitly stated 
in terms of the a-priori, and yet Heidegger is at pains throughout the introductory sections to 
establish the ontic and ontological priority of this question. In this way, the question of the 
temporal character of a-priority, in its relation to the categorial being found in the Logical 
Investigations, leads directly to the central inquiry of Being and Time. Our purpose in this 
section will be to show how Heidegger reshapes process of categorial understanding as 
described in Husserlian phenomenology into a fundamentally hermeneutic process. This 
takes the form of a transition from apophantic to hermeneutic understanding. The former is 
a process in which the structure of “predicability,” so to say, founds apophantic judgments, 
while the latter is a process in which the articulation of what is understood is founded on the 
structure of interpretability.  
Let us begin with Husserl and return to the piece of white paper as an example of categorial 
intuition. As we saw above, the «paper-as-white» can only be understood as such if intuition 
holds more than merely sensory content. A purely perceptive act cannot know the paper-as-
white because this apophantic “as” belies a further act that is not perceptive, but logical or 
categorial: we must see – in an extended sense of seeing – that the paper is white if we are to 
know the paper “as” white. For Husserl, the paper-as-white is, so to say, a “contracted” 
categorial intuition in which the being of the paper is known but passed over. It takes a careful 
phenomenological analysis to recognize the founding relation between the sensory and the 
categorial in the paper-as-white, that is, in the categorially laden intuition of the paper whose 
categorial structure has not been articulated. The paper is indeed intuited as white, but this 
being-white of the paper that allows us to know it as white, remains hidden. The intuition of 
the paper-as-white is a peculiar transitory stage between the simple sensory perception of 
white paper and the fully articulated judgment “this paper is white.” This entirely peculiar 
character of being as “excess” or “surplus” of meaning, as a feature of experience that is given 
and yet is neither something in the percept (real) nor something merely attached to it (ideal)24, 
is what brings the young Heidegger to rework the apophantic “as” of the unthematized 
categorial act into the interpretive “as” of hermeneutic understanding. This new “as” is no 
longer the mark of an ego’s theoretical activity, but rather the sign of practically concerned 
living; the paper-as-white is for Heidegger the paper-as-for-writing whose being is 
encountered most authentically in its structure as something useful [Zeug], and not in the 
apophantic judgment that predicates being25. We see just how important Husserl’s doctrine 
of categorial intuition is for Heidegger’s philosophical development. Not only does categorial 
intuition allow the recovery of the original sense of the a-priori, but it also lays bare the 
essence of the being of beings as what remain concealed in factical life. 
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The “as-structure” thus becomes for Heidegger the mark of hermeneutic understanding, 
an interpretive process developed and articulated through interpretation. Understanding is 
“already there”, so to say, before the interpretation of this or that particular entity articulates 
as what it is understood. Heidegger’s analysis of Weltlichkeit makes this clear: Dasein does 
not understand its world by cobbling it together out of individual entities understood one at 
a time. Rather, Dasein understands its world first as a whole such that entities are ontically 
disclosed not as individual objects, but as useful things whose significance rests on this whole 
of meaningful references. What is understood first is the whole, and only in the context of this 
fore-understanding does a thing have any significance26. In this sense, «the beings 
encountered and taken care of are… pre-ontologically hidden at first in their being», for the 
context of relevance within which they find their significance remains hidden27. 
It is the process of interpretation that articulates Dasein’s understanding and reveals the 
being that is usually hidden. To understand an entity explicitly means to reveal the structure 
of «something as something», so that the significance of an entity in the world is interpreted 
according to its in-order-to or for-the-sake-of. «The “as”», Heidegger writes, «constitutes the 
structure of the explicitness of what is understood; it constitutes interpretation»28. Just as 
with Husserl’s paper-as-white, which is known as being-white but only unthematically, 
Heidegger’s paper-as-for-writing is simply made use of, and thus understood in its being as a 
useful thing, without the thematization of this factical significance. For Husserl, one who 
thematizes the categorial structure of the paper-as-white must articulate its being-white, and 
likewise, for Heidegger, the significance of the paper-as-for-writing is articulated in the 
revelation of its place within the whole of in-order-to relations. We see here that the Husserlian 
and Heideggerian accounts have the same formal structure, i.e., that of an «a-structure» to be 
articulated. At the same time, we see that Heidegger’s designation of understanding as an 
interpretive process departs radically from his teacher. 
Husserl and Heidegger both recognize that things in the world are first encountered in their 
as-structure, be this a theoretical-perceptive or a practical «as». When being attentive to it, we 
never encounter mere white paper, but only paper-as-white, paper-as-for-writing. And in both 
cases this encounter of the thing in its «as-structure» already contains the being of the thing, 
though only in its pre-ontological hiddenness. Here we observe Heidegger’s debt to Husserl, 
especially in the claim that categorial intuitions, intuitions of the being of the thing, are 
unremarkable and unremarked everyday occurrences. However, Heidegger’s understanding 
of the «as-structure» is influenced just as much by his reading of Husserl as by his reading of 
Aristotle. The key to Heidegger’s understanding of this structure as an ultimately interpretive 
manner of understanding being that has its source in his reading of Aristotle. 
There are several aspects of his reading of Aristotle that contribute to Heidegger’s 
understanding of understanding as hermeneutic, aspects that coincide in the unitary 
phenomenon of facticity. First, Heidegger takes over from the Stagirite a conception of worldly 
entities as first and foremost things of practical concern, a conception that is solidified in his 
designation of worldly beings as useful things: «It is no accident that the Greek designation 
for the things they first encounter is πράγµατα, “beings with which one constantly has to do”, 
and χρήµατα, “what is taken into use”» Heidegger states in the lecture course from SS 129429, 
and we find this Greek way of encountering things entirely taken up in Being and Time30. The 
conception of worldly entities as useful things implies, on one hand, that things are never 
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originally encountered individually (hence the plural of Stambaugh’s translation of Zeug) and, 
on the other, that they are always encountered within a world as a context of relevance. This 
understanding of world is described at length in Being and Time, but this description does 
not show the extent to which its Aristotelian provenance shapes Heidegger’s understanding 
of the as-structure as hermeneutic. We will refer instead to the lecture course Introduction to 
Phenomenological Research, where the clarification of the term φαινόµενον is tied from the 
start with an elucidation of «daylight» as the context in which it is possible for things to appear 
of themselves, and of «darkness» as the context in which things are also seen, but not of 
themselves31. 
Daylight and darkness are equally constitutive of the world as the context in which 
phenomena become manifest, and this fundamental duality is the ground for the possibility 
of the «elusiveness» and «deception» of the world. Heidegger insists, in fact, that «in existence 
itself error and deception are interwoven in a completely fundamental way and do not merely 
surface in the world as some defective property that one has to overcome»32. The very being of 
the world contains the possibility of deception and elusiveness, and this makes a deceptive 
encounter not a modification of an encounter with the thing manifest «as it really is», but a 
modality of encounter that is just as basic and primordial as a daylight encounter. This duality 
in manifestation between truthfulness and deception lies also in λόγος, which does not find 
its essence in the λόγος ἀποφαντικός that points out an entity just as it is itself, but in a 
broader understanding of speech that also contains the possibility of the ψεῦδος or falsehood. 
The primordial instance of deceit in speech is not willful lying, but can only be found in factical 
speech, that is, in speech that takes place in a concrete world of concern and at a particular 
time. In factical speech, deceit is a basic possibility because speech necessarily points 
something out by «offsetting» [abheben] it from something else. In such offsetting, «what is 
offset becomes accessible and can be grasped as here», but only at the price of setting all other 
things aside33. This is the case not only when setting something apart from another thing, but 
also when setting in relief a certain aspect of the thing and not another.  
Both things and speech thus contain a basic possibility for deceit as well as truthfulness, 
but this dual possibility can only be properly understood if things, speech, and the human 
being are taken as aspects of the unitary phenomenon of facticity. It is this primordial duality 
in facticity, this mingling of daylight and darkness, truth and falsehood, and eigentlichkeit 
and uneigentlichkeit, that serves as the ground for the hermeneutic structure of 
understanding. For in factical life the piece of paper is found to be paper-as-for-writing, but 
this is at the expense of all other possibilities that belong to the being of the paper. The paper 
is paper-as-for-writing and not paper-as-for-burning because of the practical circumstances 
and projects that characterize the structure of factical life. For this reason, «we do not see 
things as subject matters in the sense that they are an object of a scientific investigation. 
[The] existence of things is much richer and affords much more fluctuating possibilities than 
have been thematically prepared»34. Heidegger calls worldly entities «useful things» precisely 
because their being is understood according to how Dasein takes them up as meaningful in 
the concerns of its practical life, and not in a scientific attitude that modifies the factical. 
This brief excursus puts us in a position to return to Husserl’s and Heidegger’s differences 
over the proper understanding of the as-structure. Following his interpretation of Aristotle, 
Heidegger proclaims the ontological priority of facticity over the Husserlian transcendental 
delimitation of consciousness, and it is here that he departs from his teacher. For Heidegger, 
the articulation of the being of the paper as useful in the context of writing makes explicit 
what is, at bottom, an interpretation of the being of the paper on the basis of Dasein’s context 
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of concern. To understand the being of the paper as for writing is not to exhaust its ontological 
possibilities, but rather to see that the meaning of the being of the paper fluctuates according 
to its context of relevance, and thus that any articulation of the significance of the paper in 
Dasein’s factical dealings is an interpretation of this being according to this ontological 
possibility and not another. In this sense, the «as-structure» is an interpretive structure. 
By contrast, Husserl’s treatment of the «as-structure» of categorial intuition ultimately 
reveals, in Heidegger’s view, his teacher’s commitment to an idea of scientific certainty that 
guides his phenomenology from the beginning. Despite what Heidegger states in his lecture 
courses35, the difference between his account of understanding and Husserl’s does not have 
its roots in the opposition of a phenomenology of the theoretical (Husserl) versus a 
phenomenology of the practical (Heidegger). For, as Husserl states, the Logical Investigations 
could have just as easily used an instance of practical concern as an example instead of the 
paper-as-white, without any change to the categorial analysis36. The difference in their 
treatment of the «as-structure» is but a symptom of their fundamental disagreement over the 
nature and purpose of phenomenology itself. Husserl leaves unquestioned the guiding 
principle of rigorous science, or, in Heidegger’s terms, the «care about already known 
knowledge»37, and determines ahead of time that phenomenology must be this kind of 
scientific endeavor. «For the idea of philosophy [in Husserl’s Philosophy as Rigorous Science], 
the guiding criterion is formally whether philosophy has come so far that it can lay down an 
objectively communicable, doctrinal content that is binding for all times», Heidegger states. 
«To the extent that it cannot, it is not a rigorous science»38. We see that Husserl is guided by 
this idea of rigorous science not only in the essay Heidegger cites, but in the analysis of 
categorial intuition itself, where Husserl lets the symbolic form of logical judgment («“A is P”… 
“an S is P”, “This S is P”» etc.) decide how intuition is to be divided into the sensory and the 
categorial39. This shows that for Husserl, formal judgment is a privileged form of λόγος that 
provides a secure, unambiguous basis for a scientific taxonomy of intuition. Heidegger, by 
contrast, privileges the λόγος of facticity, a speech that is always already involved in factical 
life and which, therefore, can only be a hermeneutic articulation of the entities Dasein 
encounters. The radicality of Heidegger’s understanding of the «as-structure» lies precisely in 
this, that every explication of the «as» is based on an interpretive process that discloses it in 
the first place, but this interpretive process is itself derivative of a pre-theoretical 
understanding of worldly significance. 
There is a distinct temporal character in Heidegger’s account of understanding, and it is in 
the peculiar temporality of understanding that a-priority makes another appearance. Already 
in the Logical Investigations we find that the fulfillment of intentions has a temporal 
dimension: There is, Husserl states, a «phenomenologically peculiar form of unity» between 
the name and the intuitive datum that is named in the intending of a thing, and this unity is 
the «consciousness of fulfillment»40. When the achievement of fulfillment is taken 
“dynamically”, i.e., from the point of view of intending consciousness, the members of the 
relation «unfold themselves in a temporal pattern». Fulfillment, the truth-begetting 
coincidence of intuition and intention, occurs both as «temporal and material coincidence». 
The dynamic fulfillment of an intention, that is, fulfillment considered from the subjective 
side, is for Husserl «an event of self-fulfillment»41. 
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Heidegger adapts this Husserlian insight to his phenomenology of factical existence, in 
which fulfillment as event becomes the present interpretation of an entity which makes 
explicit the context of an already understood world. The disclosive intention of Husserl’s 
conscious fulfillment becomes for Heidegger Dasein’s disclosive interpretation with its basis 
in a fore-understanding of the world. It is within this temporal context that «the apriori 
existential constitution of understanding» comes to the fore42. The articulation of the «as-
structure» of an entity depends on the significance of the world as a set of interrelated 
meanings, and this significance of the whole is a-priori with respect to any ontic interpretation 
that might articulate Dasein’s understanding. This peculiar a-priority is precisely the fore-
structure of understanding that inconspicuously determines the possibility of the 
understanding of useful things. Thus, when a naïve interpreter states that her interpretation 
is based simply on what is there, «that which initially “is there” is nothing other than the self-
evident, undiscussed prejudice of the interpreted which necessarily lies in every interpretive 
approach… namely, that which is pre-given in [the fore-structure of understanding»43. Thus, 
the interpretive process of understanding is the first place in Heidegger’s phenomenology 
where a-priority and hermeneutics are joined.  
At play here is a singular kind of temporality that, on one hand, conditions the possibility 
of understanding and, on the other, depends on the temporality of Dasein itself. For the fore-
structure of understanding is Dasein itself as its own project: the fore-structured significance 
of the world signifies according to Dasein’s project, the project that defines the way in which 
Dasein is in the world as caring [sorgend]. We must inquire further into the structures of 
project and care in order to grasp more fundamentally the temporality that joins a-priority 
and hermeneutics in fundamental ontology. 
 
4. Projection of Possibility and Futurality of Understanding 
Understanding is not a faculty of Dasein, but an aspect of its very being. As understanding, 
Dasein projects meaning onto the world – not as a determination thrown over a world that is 
simply present [vorhandene], but as possibility. What Dasein projects is a particular 
possibility of being, according to which the world is disclosed as significant in this or that 
way. Yet «possibility as an existential is the most primordial and the ultimate positive 
ontological determination of Dasein», so much so that Heidegger refers to Dasein as 
«potentiality of being» and «being-possible»44. The unity of Dasein and the world is thus 
highlighted in understanding as the projection of Dasein’s possibility-for being, for it is 
ultimately Dasein itself as being-in-the-world that is understood. In disclosing the totality of 
relevance of the world, Dasein at the same time discloses how its own being is to be 
understood. As we stated above, this disclosure is a-priori with respect to each instance of 
understanding, or, in Heidegger’s terms, «Dasein… has always already projected itself and is, 
as long as it is, projecting»45. 
In its priority, the structure of projection reveals a difference, a temporal gap, within 
Dasein’s being as being-possible. On one hand, factical Dasein is as it is because the 
projection of its own possibility belongs essentially to facticity. A particular possibility has 
always already been projected such that Dasein always already finds itself within an already 
significant world. On the other hand, considered according to its being-possible, Dasein is 
always more than it factically is because its being-possible exceeds its factical being. In this 
sense, Dasein is said to be ahead of itself in its understanding: it has always already thrown 
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ahead of itself a possibility that it will work out interpretively in its facticity. On the basis of 
this differential temporality, Dasein can say to itself with Nietzsche, «become what you are!»46. 
We now begin to grasp the temporality of understanding more fully. If Dasein understands 
its being-in-the-world projectively, then «the future underlies this understanding, and it does 
so as a coming-toward-oneself»47. That is to say, in interpreting a world that is always already 
significant, Dasein encounters nothing other than a possibility-of-being that it itself is – it 
encounters itself. Dasein’s ontological movement toward its world is therefore a movement 
toward itself, toward the ontological “more” of its being-possible. In this sense, Dasein is 
«constantly ahead-of-itself» and the temporality of understanding is «primarily futural»48. 
Understanding is thus the futural dimension of Dasein which, as ontologically prior, makes 
possible the interpretive encounter of the ecstatic present. The exposition of understanding 
as projected possibility made present discloses understanding more clearly as hermeneutic 
and a-priori at once – the former, because making entities present in their significance is 
Dasein’s fundamental hermeneutic situation; the latter, because this hermeneutic situation 
is grounded in the temporality of understanding, whose fore-structure constitutes its priority. 
 
5. Ontology of Dasein: A-Priori Hermeneutics and the Horizon of Time 
Our inquiry into Heidegger’s conception of understanding has thus far indicated that Dasein’s 
own temporality brings hermeneutics and a-priority together. To conclude this investigation, 
we must clarify this insight by re-inserting it in its broader context, namely, in the ontological 
question that motivates the analytic of Dasein in the first place. The answer to the question 
of the meaning of being begins, in fact, with the analytic or «hermeneutic of Dasein» and in 
turn the hermeneutic of Dasein finds its motivating force in the ontological question49. In this 
sense, the Daseinsanalyse of Being and Time is not a philosophy of subjectivity, but a 
preparation for the ontology of being as such. In the same way, our investigation of 
understanding is best understood not as a strange epistemology, but as preparatory remarks 
on the possibility of the understanding of being. 
Heidegger undertakes the analytic of Dasein because «the sole ground of possibility for the 
question of being as such is Dasein itself insofar as it is possible»50. What makes Dasein such 
a ground is that Dasein has a fore-understanding of being; the question of the meaning of 
being is possible only insofar as Dasein somehow understands being «ahead of time». In turn, 
the fore-understanding of being is possible insofar as being itself is given to understand. This 
hermeneutic situation, fore-understanding and pre-given being, is therefore the very «place» 
from which the answer to the ontological question can begin51. Being itself is pre-given as the 
«matter at hand» for factical Dasein to take up, but being itself is more fundamentally given 
“to” Dasein as that about which Dasein cannot help but be concerned, i.e., as that which 
Dasein has necessarily fore-understood. The articulation of the horizon of sense against which 
beings are understood, i.e., understanding in the “as” of interpretation, is therefore not merely 
the elucidation of this or that possibility which factical Dasein has projected, but rather, in 
its deepest ontological significance, the only possible way to work out the meaning of being 
as such52. Furthermore, we now see that Dasein itself is the very question of being because it 
is given to its own interpretive activity as that peculiar being who is pre-occupied with, who 
has a fore-understanding of, its own being. 
 
46 Ibidem. 
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We are finally able to bring together hermeneutics and a-priority in their deepest ontological 
intimacy. Their togetherness constitutes nothing short of the locus of the ontological question, 
the place where the question at once arises and finds the methodology for its own address. 
The ontology of Dasein, as the most fundamental level of hermeneutic articulation, is always 
«structured and guided in advance in accordance with the [fore-understanding] of hermeneutic 
interpretation»53. Therefore, the development of understanding in interpretation, the 
hermeneutic understanding analyzed thus far, is the only possible method for coming to 
properly ontological, that is, a-priori conclusions regarding the question of being. 
The lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology makes the last step toward this 
inextricability of a-priority and hermeneutics in fundamental ontology. The end of the course 
focuses on difference in an ontological and temporal sense: the difference between being and 
beings, and the difference between temporality and Temporality. It is within this differential 
context that Heidegger writes, «because they are assertions about being in the light of time, all 
ontological propositions are Temporal propositions». Only as Temporal can ontological 
propositions be properly ontological, which is to say «a priori propositions»54. If at the origin of 
fundamental ontology lies the hermeneutic situation – originarily given being that is 
interpreted according to an always already a-priori understanding – the priority of both fore-
understanding and being is only possible because time is the horizonal condition against 
which the question of being can arise at all. Thus Heidegger states that «if being, which has 
always already been understood “earlier” is to become an express object, then the 
objectification of this prius, which was forgotten, must have the character of a coming back 
to what was already once and already earlier understood»55. The understanding of being is 
fundamentally inscribed in time because its possibility depends on the futural being-ahead-
of-itself of Dasein as projecting, that is, on the temporal and ontological difference that lies at 
the heart of Dasein. At once factical and ontological, Dasein carries within itself difference as 
ek-stasis, as that which makes possible the prior and the posterior, as that which structures 
understanding as hermeneutically circular. Thus, the possibility of understanding being is 
such that it requires a fore-understanding of being, and the possibility of this fore-
understanding demands a «pre-cursory» projection upon time itself. For «time is earlier than 
any possible earlier… it is the condition for an earlier as such»56. We can conclude, therefore, 
that the hermeneutic situation of ontological understanding is what is a-priori in fundamental 
ontology, but the a-priori as such, the ‘earlier’ as such, finds its possibility in its inscription 
in the primissimus, in time itself. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We can conclude that in his engagement of Husserl, particularly in the Logical Investigations, 
but also through his interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger forges a phenomenology in which 
a-priority and hermeneutics are inseparable. In the account of categorial intuition of the 
Logical Investigation Heidegger finds a kind of a-priority that is not limited to the immanence 
of the subject. Husserl shows that the being of beings in its categorial determinations is given 
in simple intuition as a sui generis excess of meaning, and this leads Heidegger to conclude 
that phenomenology is the only possible methodology for working out a fundamental ontology. 
Furthermore, the differing treatment of the «as-structure» between the two phenomenologists 
showed itself to be symptomatic of a much deeper, if not fundamental, difference between 
their philosophical approaches. While Husserl is guided in advance by the idea of rigorous 
science, Heidegger’s Aristotelian heritage leads him to outline the phenomenon of facticity as 
the only possible point of departure for all phenomenological investigations. Thus, where 
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Husserl’s «care for already known knowledge» leads him to demand scientific results that are 
«binding for all time», Heidegger’s analysis of facticity leads him to a conception of being that 
depends on interpretation for its meaning. In this way, Heidegger brings an essentially 
hermeneutic understanding of understanding to bear on Husserl’s conception of truth as 
fulfillment. Phenomenological truth for Husserl must be understood as the event of truth, as 
unavoidably temporal in character, and it is into this temporal context that Heidegger brings 
his idea of phenomenology as the hermeneutics of facticity. The result of Heidegger’s 
conception of Dasein as self-understanding in a fundamentally futural, temporal way. What 
Dasein works out in interpreting its interaction with factical entities is in fact its own fore-
understanding of being, which is to say, Dasein itself in its potentiality-of-being, in its 
understanding openness to being. Ultimately, it is Dasein’s hermeneutic relation to being, its 
hermeneutic situation with respect to being, that is a-priori, but the very possibility for this 
temporal determination is grounded and inscribed in Dasein’s own Temporality. Time itself, 
as the condition of possibility for any «earlier» as such, is what makes possible the a-priority 
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